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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an appeal from the denial of a motion for a preliminary

injunction. Plaintiff Cindy Lee Garcia ("Plaintiff' or "Ms. Garcia") is an
ordained Christian minister and an actress who delivered a dramatic
supporting performance in what Defendant Nakoula Basseley Nakoula and
his agents told her was a benign, low-budget "Arabian" desert adventure
film. The film, Ms. Garcia was told, would be titled "Desert Warrior."
Instead, Defendant Nakoula and/or his agents took Ms. Garcia's "Desert
Warrior" performance, dubbed it over almost beyond recognition, and
inserted it into the trailer for another film entirely, which Defendant Nakoula
and/or his agents titled, "The Innocence of Muslims" (hereinafter both the
film and its trailer will be referred to as the "Film"). In the trailer for the
Film, Ms. Garcia, who had delivered lines for "Desert Warrior" expressing
concern for her character's daughter, was instead made to appear, through
post-performance dubbing in which she did not participate and to which she
did not consent, to accuse Mohammed, the founder of the Islamic religion,
of being a child molester. Subsequently, Ms. Garcia's altered performance
was translated into Arabic, both through additional dubbing and/or through
the use of subtitles; the versions of the Film that were accessible to an
Arabic-speaking audience were posted on YouTube on or around September
11,2012. That day, the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya, was attacked,
resulting in the death of four Americans. Initially, both the worldwide
media and the U.S. government blamed the Film for inciting the violence in
Benghazi, the assassination of Benghazi-based U.S. Ambassador
Christopher Stevens, and deadly, worldwide demonstrations against the
Film.
1
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Although the ultimate cause of the attacks and demonstrations may
never be known for certain, the main issue in this case involves the vicious
frenzy against Ms. Garcia that the Film caused among certain radical
elements of the Muslim community beginning around the time of the
Benghazi attacks. Specifically, ever since Defendants posted the Arabic
version of the Film to YouTube, Ms. Garcia has become the subject of an
Egyptian fatwa, in which a prominent cleric called upon American Muslim
youth to kill her; Ms. Garcia has received and continues to receive
numerous, credible death threats. Shortly after she became aware of the
existence of the Arabic version of the Film, and the death threats began to
arrive, Ms. Garcia immediately sought to enjoin any further publication of
her performance in the Film. The basis for the injunction is that the makers
of the Film, along with the Film's republishers (which include Defendants
Google, Inc. and Y ouTube, which have refused to remove the Film either as
posted by Defendant Nakoula and his agents or by the hundreds of third
parties who indisputably own no copyright in the Film), have violated her
copyright interest in the dramatic performance that she gave for "Desert
Warrior." At the district court, Ms. Garcia pointed out that she never
consented to appear in "The Innocence of Muslims" and, in fact, had never
released her copyright in "Desert Warrior" to any of the Defendants.
Furthermore, Ms. Garcia noted that even if Defendants could argue that she
had provided an "implied" license of her work for the Film "Desert
Warrior," that consent was limited to the project in which she agreed to
appear, and that Defendants had breached any implied license when they
used her as a "puppet" who appeared to spout their hatred of Muslims and
the Islamic religion. Finally, Ms. Garcia informed the district court that her

2
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life and the lives of her family members (who also have received death and
rape threats) are in grave danger as the result of Defendants' actions.
The district court declined to hear the matter on an ex parte basis and
converted the application to a motion for a preliminary injunction. After the
matter was fully briefed and without leave of court, just three days before
the scheduled hearing, Defendants Google and Y ouTube submitted
documents that purported to be a signed release by Plaintiff consenting to
use of her performance in anything. On the eve of the hearing, the district
denied the motion for preliminary injunction without even permitting a

hearing, notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiff had already provided the
district court with credible evidence (including the opinion of an expert
handwriting analyst) that the documents submitted by Google and YouTube
were forgeries.
The first legal issue presented by this appeal is whether Plaintiff
Garcia established that, in the absence of an injunction, she will suffer
irreparable harm. Surely, the official pronouncement of a death sentence on
Plaintiff, followed by numerous credible death threats, as a result of her
appearance in the Film must constitute irreparable harm. The district court
erred when it focused on the fact that Defendant Nakoula and/or his agents
quietly posted an English-language version of the Film on YouTube in July
of 20 12, which received no media attention and no attention from the
radicals that currently are threatening Ms. Garcia. The critical time frame
begins at the moment at which Plaintiff s life was placed in danger - and
that did not occur until after the Benghazi attacks on September 11, 2012,
when the Film received worldwide notoriety. Plaintiff, a woman of
extremely modest means, acted promptly by seeking court relief within a
week in the state court and then by seeking federal court protection within
3
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less than 30 days. The district court's conclusion-that that Plaintiff waited
too long and thus that her life was not worth saving-was an abuse of
discretion. To the extent that the district court held that numerous and
credible death threats against Plaintiff do not constitute irreparable hann,
such a conclusion is also an abuse of discretion.
The second issue is whether Ms. Garcia has a legally cognizable
copyright claim. The district court held that Ms. Garcia was not the "author"
of the Film - i.e., its producer or director - and therefore her perfonnance in
"Desert Warrior" was somehow merged into a unitary whole together with
Defendants' hateful propaganda film, causing her to lose all of her
intellectual property rights in her creative acting performance. This was an
incorrect statement of the law, and this Court should review it de novo.
Contrary to the trial court's conclusion, an actor does, in fact, retain a
copyright in his or her performance (once it is fixed in a tangible medium)
unless she is an employee, has signed a release, or has agreed in writing that
the performance is a work for hire. None of those copyright exceptions
apply in this case. What's more, even if Ms. Garcia did convey an "implied"
license to Defendant Nakoula and/or his agents (which she did not), that
license extended only to the performance that she actually gave, which was a
benign supporting role in the "Desert Warrior" adventure film. Neither
Defendants nor the trial court cited any authority (and Plaintiff believes that
no such authority exists) that the "implied license" exception upon which
Defendants and the trial court relied extends to entirely unrelated projects
and/or willful deception of the actor as to the nature of the project, as
occurred in this case. Indeed, it is undisputed that the film "Desert Warrior"
contained no references to the Muslim faith or its founder, Mohammed.
Plaintiff neither expressly nor impliedly consented that her dramatic
4
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perfonnance could be used, dubbed over with hateful dialogue and inserted
into the propaganda Film. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it refused
to issue a preliminary injunction, and Plaintiff respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the trial court's decision.

II.

JURISDICTION
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331

because Plaintiff brought her claims under federal law, specificaily under the
United States Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 101, et seq. This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).

III.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether Plaintiff will suffer irreparable hann in the absence of

a preliminary injunction,
2.

Whether an actor retains a copyright interest in her dramatic

perfonnance fixed to a tangible medium, particularly in the absence of a
signed writing or release, such that she may assert a copyright claim where
her perfonnance is taken from one film and inserted into a completely
different film, for which she also did not sign a release, even if that actor is
found to have granted an implied limited license to use her perfonnance in
the first film.

IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 26, 2012, just 15 days after the attacks in Benghazi,

Plaintiff Garcia brought suit against "Nakoula Basseley Nakoula," Google,
Inc., and YouTube LLC. Complaint (Excerpts ofRecord ("ER '') 1-62.)
Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (the "Complaint") on October 4,
2012, which amended Defendant Nakoula's name to Mark Yousseff
("Yousseff'), after it was revealed in his federal criminal probation
revocation proceeding that he had lied to the United States District Court,
5
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the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Probation
Department about his true name. First Amended Complaint (HFA C '); ER
63. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Yousseff violated Plaintiff s copyright
interest in her dramatic performance by taking her performance in the
supposedly benign film "Desert Warrior" and dubbing it over with hateful
words in English and Arabic, as well as subtitling the hateful words in
Arabic, and placing her performance into the Film, a trailer entitled
"Innocence of Muslims." FAC ~ 4; ER 65. Initially, the world media
reported the Film as having caused havoc in the Middle East and elsewhere.
FAC ~~ 1-3; ER 64. Plaintiff alleged secondary infringement claims against
Google and Y ouTube for republishing the Film, which resulted in gruesome
and credible death threats and an Egyptian cleric's issuance of a "fatwa"
demanding Plaintiffs death. FAC ~ 35; ER 71.
On October 11,2012, Plaintiff made a routine ex parte application for
an order to exceed the page limits of her brief. Plaintiff's Ex Parte
Application to Exceed page Limits Set Forth in Local Rule 11-6; ER 123.
The district court denied the application on October 15,2012. ER 133-134.
On October 17, 2012, Plaintiff applied for a temporary restraining order. ER
135. The district court denied the application and converted the application
to a motion for a preliminary injunction. ER 601-602. On October 29,

2012, Defendants Google and YouTube (but not Y ousseff) opposed the
motion. ER 611-641. Plaintiff filed a reply on November 5, 2012. ER 686783. The hearing was set for December 3,2012.
On November 28,2012, without leave of court to file any additional
papers, Defendants Google and Y ouTube filed purported "releases" that they
claim Plaintiff executed, in which Plaintiff transferred all of her intellectual
property rights to an unknown entity. Declarations ofMark Basseley
6
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Yousseff and Timothy L. Alger; ER 791-806. Within 48 hours, Plaintiff filed

objections to the untimely and improper evidence, and obtained the expert
opinion of an established, well-respected forensic document examiner, who
concluded unequivocally that the documents offered were forgeries.
Plaintiff's Objections to and Request to Strike Declarations of Tim Alger
and Mark Basseley Yousseff; Declarations ofM Cris Armenta, Gaylord
Flynn, Cindy Lee Garcia and Jim Blanco; ER 817-890 and ER 895-945.

That same day, November 30,2012, the district court abruptly canceled the
scheduled hearing, denying Plaintiff both a preliminary injunction and her
day in court. ER 892-849. This appeal follows.

v.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Plaintiff Agreed to Provide a Dramatic Performance in
"Desert Warrior" But Did Not Agree, In Writing or
Otherwise, to Relinquish Her Copyright Interests.

Plaintiff is an ordained Christian minister. Declaration of Cindy Lee
Garcia ('Garcia Decl. '')

~

3; ER 193. She began acting to supplement her

income after her husband became disabled. Id.

~

3; ER 193. As a minister,

Ms. Garcia preaches tolerance and respect for all religions. Id.

~

4; ER 193.

The depiction of Plaintiff Garcia as a person who would participate in a
hateful production that blasphemes any religion is devastating to her. Id.

~

4; ER 193.

In July of 20 11, Plaintiff responded to a casting notice for a film
entitled "Desert Warrior." Id.

~

5; ER 193. Plaintiffwas cast in a

supporting role in which, according to the film's producer, Yousseff (who at
the time was calling himself "Sam Bacile"), she was to play the mother of a
young woman who had been promised in marriage to the movie's
protagonist, "Master George." (Id.) After Plaintiff was cast, Yousseff gave
7
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her "call sheets" that indicated the days she was to be on set, and outlined
~

the scenes to be filmed. Id.

6; ER 193-194. Additionally, Yousseffandlor

his agents provided Plaintiff with "script sheets" for those scenes in which
her character was to appear. Id. None of those sheets contained content or
language that Plaintiff perceived to be religiously offensive. Id. Notably,
none of the script sheets referred to a character named "Mohammed." Id.
Plaintiff never signed a release of her rights to her dramatic
performance (whether with respect to "Desert Warrior" or any other project),
nor did she sign a work-for-hire agreement. Id.

~

8; ER 194. Additionally,

she was never an employee of Y ousseff or any production company
associated with "Desert Warrior," nor was she an agent ofYousseff or
anyone else. Garcia Dec!.

~

7; ER 194. Plaintiff s position in this regard is

entirely consistent with the recollections of other actors who appeared in the
production: none of them apparently signed releases, nor did they sign
work-for-hire agreements. Declaration ofDan Sutter
Gaylord Flynn

~

~

4; Declaration of

8; ER 194.

Both prior to accepting the role and while on set, Plaintiff specifically
asked Y ousseff (who was using the alias "Sam Bacile") about the film's
content. Garcia Decl.

~

10; ER 194. Yousseff consistently responded that

the film was titled "Desert Warrior," and that it was an "adventure" story set
in the Arabian Desert 2,000 years ago. Id. Significantly, at no time during
her presence on the set did Plaintiff hear any mention of Islam. Id.
Accordingly, Plaintiff delivered her performance (the "Copyrighted
Performance") as set forth in the "Desert Warrior" script.
It is now undisputed that, contrary to his stated intentions, Y ousseff

never intended to create an "adventure" film titled "Desert Warrior."
Instead, as he later admitted to Plaintiff, his true intention from the
8
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beginning was to use her (copyrighted) performance to create an entirely
different work, the propaganda Film titled "Innocence of Muslims." Id.

~

13; ER 196.

B.

Yousseff Used Plaintiff As a "Puppet" For His Own
Prejudiced Views, and YouTube Has Knowingly Published
the Infringing, Doctored Version of Plaintiff's Performance
Tens of Millions of Times.

In March of 20 12, Yousseff requested that Plaintiff participate in a
post-production session. Id.

~

11; ER 195. During that session, Plaintiff

only redelivered lines she had delivered previously. Id. Sometime after July
2, 2012, Plaintiff telephoned Y ousseff to ask whether "Desert Warriors" was
ready to be screened. Id.
trailer on YouTube. Id.

~

~

12. Y ousseff then revealed that he had posted a

12.

When Plaintiff accessed the trailer (by then retitled "Innocence of
Muslims," and referred to throughout this brief as the "Film") on Y ouTube
she made the horrifying discovery that Yousseffhad dubbed bigoted
dialogue over her lines, and used her Copyrighted Performance in a manner
that was entirely inconsistent with the production in which Yousseffhad told
Plaintiff she was participating. Id.

~

12; ER 195. In effect, Youssefftumed

her into a walking, talking "puppet" for his opinion that Mohammed, the
founder of the Islamic religion, was a "child molester." Id.
Here are the lines that Plaintiff Garcia actually delivered in "Desert
Warrior":

"Is George crazy? Our daughter is but a child?"

Id.

~

12; ER 195.
9
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In contrast, in the Film ("Innocence of Muslims"), Yousseffretained
Ms. Garcia's visual performance but dubbed in the words:

"Is your Mohammed a child molester?"

See id.

~

12, and Ex. B to Declaration ofDave Hardy (,'Hardy Dec!. '')

(YouTube video, "The Innocence ofMuslims ", posted by "Sam Bacile ''); ER

195. Plaintiff has never uttered those words, let alone on the set of "Desert
Warrior." Garcia Decl.
C.

~

12; ER 196.

Defendants Next Published an Arabic Version of the Film
That Went Viral, Ultimately Resulting in the Issuance of a
Death Sentence and Innumerable Death Threats Against
Plaintiff, to which Defendants Are Completely Indifferent.

On September 11,2012, the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, was
attacked, resulting in the deaths of four Americans, including Ambassador
Christopher Stevens. Declaration ofAbou El Fadl,
has continued to erupt across the world. Id.

~

~

10; ER 248. Violence

11; ER 248. Many experts in

geopolitical affairs initially attributed this violence directly to the Film. Id.

~

9-15; ER 249. News reports indicate that many people worldwide have
died in the violence that the Film has sparked. Id., Ex. D; ER 250. Whether
or not the Film caused the violence, the violence in fact occurred, with many
at the time attributing it to the anti-Muslim sentiment in the Film. Id.,

~

15;

ER 249-250.

On September 19,2012, Egyptian cleric Ahmad Fouad Ashoush
issued a "fatwa" directed at Plaintiff and every other person appearing in
"The Innocence of Muslims":

10
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I issue a fatwa and call on the Muslim youth in America and
Europe to do this duty, which is to kill the director, the
J?roducer and the actors and everyone who helped and promoted
the film.

Id.

~

14; ER 249.
Google Chairman Eric Schmidt's response to the fatwa was

astounding, though perhaps not surprising given that the fatwa was not
directed at him and, unlike Plaintiff, he likely has the financial means to hire
private security. He said: "We believe the answer to bad speech is more
speech ... It'll stay up." Declaration of M Cris Armenta Decl.

~

9, & Ex.

C; ER 489. Needless to say, neither Mr. Schmidt, nor Google, nor YouTube
offered Plaintiff any security-related assistance, leaving Plaintiff and her
family "sitting ducks." Naturally, Plaintiff has no desire to become a martyr
for Yousseff and Schmidt's "cause" of attacking Islam while pretending that
Y ouTube and Google are neutral defenders of free speech. Nor has she any
interest in helping Defendants to profit from the 30 million-plus "views,"
and associated ad revenues, from exhibiting the Film and her Copyrighted
Performance.

D.

Yousseff Has Admitted That He Defrauded aod Deceived
Plaintiff for the Purpose of Procuring Her Copyrighted
Performance in "Desert Warrior," And That He Planned
All Along to Insert Her Performance Ioto the Propaganda

Film.
Immediately after seeing the news about the attacks in Libya and
realizing that the grotesque manipulation of her performance was related to
the violence around the world, Plaintiff asked Y ousseff why he "did this?"

Garcia Decl.

~

13; ER 196. He replied, "You are not responsible. Tell the

world that you are innocent. I did this ... I did it because I am tired of the
radical Muslims killing innocent people." Id.
11

~

10; ER 194-195. In essence,
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Yousseff admitted that it was always his secret intention to manipulate the
footage so that Plaintiff would appear to have participated in creating a hate
film. Id. In that conversation, Y ousseff, by telling Plaintiff that she was
"innocent" and "not responsible," affirmed that the work that became
"Innocence of Muslims" was not a "joint work," and that he acted alone.
See Garcia Deel.

~

13; ER 196. Moreover, Mr. Yousseffs statements to

Ms. Garcia constitute an admission that she had not given him permission to
insert her (doctored) Copyrighted Performance in "Desert Warriors" into the
hate Film "The Innocence of Muslims."

E.

In Addition to Becoming the Target of a Fatwa, Ms. Garcia

Has Received Numerous Death Threats.
Immediately after the Film "went viral" on YouTube, Plaintiff began
to receive calls from the media, all of whom apparently were already
somehow aware that her Copyrighted Performance was prominently featured
in the Film. Garcia Deel.

~

14; ER 196. Members of the media, none of

whom had been given Ms. Garcia's address by Ms. Garcia or her family,
camped outside her home. Id.

~

14; ER 196.) Plaintiff learned about the

latwa and began to receive credible and gruesome threats, including death
threats and threats to rape her daughter. Id. In order to clear her name, to
ensure that the world was aware that she was duped into performing for
Y ousseff, and to clarify that she had never uttered the words attributed to her
in the Film, she publicly declared that she does not condone the content or
message of the Film, and that her Copyrighted Performance in "Desert
Warrior" had been grotesquely mutilated. Id.

~

14; ER 196. Hoping that the

justice system would show more concern for her continued survival than had
the Defendants, Plaintiff took legal action in state court, premised on various

12
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theories of tort liability, to have the Film removed from YouTube. Id.

~~

14,15; ER 196-197.)
While in Los Angeles Superior Court on September 20,2012, for a
hearing on her state-law claims, Plaintiff and her counsel were directed by
law enforcement to park in a secure location; seven armed Los Angeles
County Deputy Sheriffs accompanied them in the courthouse. Id.

196-197; Armenta Dec!.

~

~

15; ER

2; ER 487.) Her attorney was approached by the

head of security for the Los Angeles Superior Court, who expressed concern
for Plaintiff, Ms. Armenta, and both of their families; he advised that those
threatening Plaintiff "are very patient," and that everybody connected with
this case was in danger. Id.; Garcia Decl.

~

15; ER 196-197. Both were

advised to take serious security measures at home, as well as any time at
which they may enter or exit the L.A. Superior Court in the future. Garcia

Dec!.

~

15 ER 196-197; Armenta Dec!.

~

2; ER 487.

While in New York during the last week of September 2012, Plaintiff
and counsel were accompanied by retired police officers and other security
officers. Garcia Dec!.

~

16; ER 197. When they departed New York, the

Port Authority Police would not permit Plaintiff even to enter the La
Guardia International Airport terminal; Plaintiff was taken directly to her
airplane on the tarmac in a squad car, for fear that she would become an
"instant target" in the terminal. Id. Plaintiff has now moved her home, as
well as the location of her church. Id.

~

17; ER 197-198. The numerous

death threats have been reported to the authorities. Id. They include, but are
not limited to, the following:
"I am ready to die for MUHAMMAD (PBUH) and I would
Like to Kill all Those Who contributed in the Shape of Acting
or Financially or any other Kind of Support in Shameless
Movie."
13

Case: 12-57302

01/18/2013

ID: 8479689

DktEntry: 5-1

Page: 21 of 47

"And If You Wanna to save your life and we consider your
innocent then Just Kill Sam and Terry Jones."
"Dear the end is near."
"It's all a bigioke. She will be Killed by someone who loves
and cares our Prophet Muhammad peace be upon him"
"She will know what she did now she is saying sorry about
that"

Id. , 17 & Ex. B) (grammatical errors in original); ER 197-198. Ms. Garcia

also received a gruesome set of threats related to raping her daughter. Id.
As frightening and disturbing as these threats have been to Plaintiff,
according to noted international expert and UCLA Professor Abou El Fadl,
it is the threats that are not made that are the most dangerous. Abou El Fadl
, 17; ER 250. Thanks to Defendants' refusal to remove the Film that
contains her Copyrighted Performance from YouTube, Plaintiffs life has
been changed forever. Id. , 16; ER 250. It is only her public efforts to clear
her name that may be keeping her alive and her efforts to remove or disable
the Film will certainly help to convince others that she is not a willing
puppet ofa global conspiracy against Islam. Id. ,21; ER 251.

F.

Plaintiff Has Be2e:ed YouTube and Go021e to Save Her Life
and Take Down the Film, But They Prefer to Continue to
Profit From the Millions of Pa2eviews That the Film
Attracts.

In accordance with Y ouTube' s terms of service, Appellant issued the
first of many DMCA take down notices on September 24, 2012, through her
take down agent, DMCA Solutions. Hardy Decl.,

~

5; ER 409. Appellant

and DMCA Solutions have issued eight take down notices. In the
14
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experience ofDMCA Solutions, YouTube typically responds to an initial
take down notice in a manner intended to protect itself from liability for
contributory copyright infringement pursuant to the "safe harbor" provisions
of the DMCA. Id., ,-r 4; ER 408-409. First, YouTube typically sends a
notice advising that the notice has been received ("Acknowledgement of
Takedown Notice"). Next, Y ouTube typically quickly removes or disables
the allegedly infringing content pending the original poster's provision of
proof that he or she has the right to post it. Id.
Y ouTube itself, through the Associate General Counsel of Google,
Inc. (YouTube's parent company) Zavanah Levine, has issued a sworn
statement in which she agrees that YouTube's DMCA procedures are
consistent with the observations of DMCA Solutions:
Once Y ouTube receives a notification of alleged infringement
that substantially complies with the DMCA requirements, we
act promptly to remove the identified material from our service
or disable access to it. ThrouKhout my tenure at the comp~llY,
we have removed almost all oT the videos identified in DMCA
notices within 24 hours; indeed for the vast majority of DMCA
notices (about 85%), we remove the identified videos within a
few minutes using automated tools.

Declaration ofZavanah Levine, ,-r 19; ER 294. This time, contrary to the
policy and protocols sworn to by Ms. Levine, and the practices long
observed in the industry, YouTube did not remove or disable the content
within 24 hours. Instead, it sent multiple, identical form letters denying Ms.
Garcia's requests. Hardy Dec!. ,-r 7 & Ex. C ("YouTube 's First Substantive

Inquiry''); ER 409-410. In response to YouTube's First Inquiry Response,
Appellant's takedown agent sent a detailed response explaining her
copyright interests, setting forth the relevant law. Id. ,-r 8 & Ex. D

("Garcia's First Substantive Response ''); ER 410-412. Ms. Garcia sent the
First Substantive Response on September 26, 2012. Id. By October 2,2012,
15
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YouTube still had neither responded nor disabled the content. Id.,

~

9; ER

412. Y ouTube has breathed life into a work of fiction that is causing
violence and death the world over.
On October 2, 2012, counsel for Appellant Garcia spoke directly with
counsel for Defendants Google and YouTube. Armenta Dec!.

~

4; ER 488.

Defense counsel informed Ms. Armenta that the Film remained posted, that
a decision had been made "at the highest levels" to keep it up, and that
Y ouTube was not obligated to respond to Ms. Garcia---even though it was
Y ouTube that had demanded "further information ... [in] as much detail as
possible"! (Id. )
Within two hours of that conversation, Appellant received another
inquiry from Y ouTube, requesting even more information. Hardy Dec!.

~

9

("YouTube's Second Inquiry"); ER 412-416. Appellant's takedown agent
then issued Garcia's Second Substantive Response, citing additional relevant
case law and provisions of the United States Copyright Act. Hardy Decl.

~

10 & Ex. E; ER 414. Finally on October 4,2012, YouTube set forth its final
position - consistent with Chairman Schmidt's public remarks-that Google
and Y ouTube would continue to post all copies of the Film. I Hardy Decl. ~

11 ("YouTube's Final Response''); ER 416-417.

Significantly, neither Google nor YouTube has taken any steps to take
down po stings of the Film that have been put up by third parties entirely
unrelated to the Film or any of the persons involved in its production, which
third parties indisputably are committing copyright infringement.
1
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You Tube and Google Have Specific Knowled2e of the
Infrin2in2 Material and Are in Receipt of Direct Financial
Benefits Attributed to the Rampant Infringement.

y ouTube has long been in possession of actual notice of the URLs

that contain the infringing content. YouTube claims to have received more
than 30 million "views" of the Film in the English language alone; it has not
provided information of which Plaintiffs are aware that would quantify the
number of "views". See generally Hardy Dec!. & Exs. appended thereto; ER
408-418. It is incontrovertible that the trailer is a "draw" for consumerswhose viewings provide YouTube with profit from ad revenues-to visit
YouTube. YouTube and Google have the ability to block access to the
trailer-in fact, they have already made the editorial judgment to do so in
Saudi Arabia, Libya, Indonesia, and Egypt, and may have done so in other
countries. Armenta Decl.

H.

~

9 & Ex. C; ER 489.

Defendants Google and YouTube's Response.

Defendants Google and YouTube opposed injunctive relief, arguing
that Appellant had not identified any irreparable harm, and that Ms. Garcia
committed inexcusable delay by because she did not file her complaint until
September 19,2012. Defendants also argued, against the weight both of
Ninth Circuit authority and the opinion of the United States Copyright
Office as recently set forth at the World Intellectual Property Organization,
both that Ms. Garcia could not hold a copyright interest in her own
performance and that, notwithstanding the absence of a written release, her
performance must have been a "work for hire." Defendants finally argued
that the equities did not tip in Appellant's favor and that an injunction would
be an unlawful prior restraint that would not serve the public interest.

17
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Appellant responded in her reply brief that the ongoing death threats
as a result of Google and YouTube's continued publication of the Film
certainly constitute irreparable harm. Appellant also demonstrated that
under the prevailing authority in the Ninth Circuit, and as acknowledged by
the official position of the United States in connection with the World
Intellectual Property Organization treaty, an actor's individual performance
is, in fact, copyrightable, once that performance is fixed in a tangible
medium. Finally, Appellant noted that Google and YouTube submitted no
evidence to support their guess that Ms. Garcia must have agreed to work for
hire. Further, two well established and indisputably relevant exceptions to
the First Amendment apply in this case: (1) restraint against copyright
infringement; and (2) restraint against permitting a person to shout "Fire!" in
a crowded theater. As to the first point, it is virtually indisputed that Ms.
Garcia never agreed to a work-for-hire or any other arrangement that would
result in the cession of her intellectual property rights to Yousseff and/or his
agents. As to the second point, it is well to remember that Y ouTube itself
erected a crowded theater, and given that Yousseff clearly (and successfully)
intended the Film to incite violence, restraining further publication of the
trailer does not run afoul of the First Amendment. The public, would, in
fact, be served by restraining further publication of the Film, when
considering balancing the right to speak versus the violence that has ensued.
Nothing stops Yousseff or any other person from insulting Muslims, the
Islamic religion, or any Islamic religious figures, including Mohammed.
However, what Defendants may not do is force Ms. Garcia to do their dirty
work, in contravention of her own opinions and beliefs.

18
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Defendants Google and YouTube Employed Forgery and
the Declaration of a Convicted Fraudster to Bolster Their
Defense at the Eleventh Hour Before the Hearing in This

Case.
After the motion for preliminary injunction was fully briefed and all
that awaited was the December 3,2012, hearing, on November 28,2012,
Defendants Google and Y ouTube submitted two declarations without any
leave of court to do so. Defendant Yousseff, a convicted fraudster who is
currently sitting in a federal prison for various parole violations related to
that conviction, executed a declaration (apparently drafted by counsel for
Google and YouTube) that attached two documents, a "Cast Deal Memo"
and a "Release," both of which Appellant purportedly signed. Appellant
questioned the authenticity of the documents, informed defense counsel of
their dubious nature, and immediately retained a well-respected forensic
document examiner, James Blanco. After reviewing the documents and
numerous samples of Plaintiffs handwriting, Mr. Blanco concluded
unequivocally that Mr. Yousseffs documents are a forgery. Appellant
alerted Defendants and the Court that Mr. Blanco's signed declaration would
be forthcoming and made efforts to immediately secure and file it. To her
shock, just minutes before she uploaded Mr. Blanco's declaration was
uploaded to the court's electronic filing system, the district court issued an
order denying the motion for preliminary injunction and vacating the
December 3,2012 hearing.
The district court's decision does not appear on its face to have been
dependent on the forged documents submitted by Defendants Google and
YouTube. It is significant to note, however, that the assumption that
Defendants Google and Y ouTube offered in their opposition - that
19
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Appellant must have signed a release (because everyone in the film industry
signs one) - has been handily refuted. Ms. Garcia never signed any release
of her rights, was not an employee of Y ousseff or anybody else, and her
performance was not documented as a "work for hire."

J.

The District Court's Decision.

As noted above, the district court refused to hear oral argument and
denied Appellant's motion apparently without having the benefit of the
knowledge that Defendants are now staking their case on forged documents.
In its decision, the district court instead concluded that Appellant failed to
show irreparable harm. 2 It further concluded that Ms. Garcia holds no
copyright interest to her dramatic performance in the Film.
The district court's decision was wrong for many reasons. First, the
district court failed to acknowledge that the performance Ms. Garcia
delivered was for the "adventure" story "Desert Warrior," not the
propaganda Film "Innocence of Muslims." Second, the district court erred
and missed the point when it held that because Appellant is not the "author"
of "Desert Warrior," unlike a producer, director or scriptwriter, she could
not hold a copyright - she does, but only in the part that constitutes her
creative performance. Specifically, the court concluded that the "movie was
intended by everyone involved with it to be a unitary whole," and therefore
the copyright "vests initially in the author or authors of the work," and does
no vest in an actor - contrary to the case law, the United States Copyright
Under the district court's reasoning, it would be hard to imagine a case in
which a Appellant could show imminent or irreparable harm. Must Cindy
Lee Garcia be murdered as threatened, must her daughter be raped as
threatened, must the fatwa be carried out as threatened resulting in her
murder or the rape of her daughter, in order for her to demonstrate the
likelihood of harm?
2
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Act and the position of the United States in recently approving an
international treaty on the subject. Third, although the district court
acknowledged Appellant's position "that she owns the copyright of her
performance," it concluded that Appellant "necessarily (if impliedly) would
have granted the Film's author a license to distribute her performance as a
contribution incorporated into the indivisible whole of the Film." This
conclusion was wrong not only because it conflicts with the law of the Ninth
Circuit and the position of the U.S. Copyright Office, but also because even
if Ms. Garcia did grant some implied, non-written, unspoken "license" to
Yousseff and!or his agents, the scope of that license would have been limited
to the use of her performance in a desert adventure film with the working
title "Desert Warrior" - not a propaganda Film in which her lines were redubbed with the express intention of fomenting worldwide hatred. Having
denied the motion on the above grounds, the district court did not reach the
issues of balance of equities and the public interest.
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Act and the position of the United States in recently approving an
international treaty on the subject. Third, although the district court
acknowledged Appellant's position "that she owns the copyright of her
performance," it concluded that Appellant "necessarily (if impliedly) would
have granted the Film's author a license to distribute her performance as a
contribution incorporated into the indivisible whole of the Film." This
conclusion was wrong not only because it conflicts with the law of the Ninth
Circuit and the position of the U.S. Copyright Office, but also because even
if Ms. Garcia did grant some implied, non-written, unspoken "license" to
Yousseff and!or his agents, the scope of that license would have been limited
to the use of her performance in a desert adventure film with the working
title "Desert Warrior" - not a propaganda Film in which her lines were redubbed with the express intention of fomenting worldwide hatred. Having
denied the motion on the above grounds, the district court did not reach the
issues of balance of equities and the public interest.

VI.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The primary legal question, which will impact the entire entertainment

industry, is whether an actor owns a copyrightable interest in her dramatic
performance in a film, where the actor has not made a writing assigning her
interest and the film makers later take her performance and insert a doctored
version of it into a wholly different property. By way of example, if an actor
performed in a benign action film or documentary and the filmmaker later
took that benign performance and inserted it into a hard-core pornographic
film, does the actor retain a copyrightable interest in his or her original
performance such that he or she could avail herself of the remedies of the
United States Copyright Act to enjoin publication of the performance in the
21
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later work? The answer is yes, and is guided quite specifically by this
Circuit's decision in Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir.
1990). In Effects, this Circuit held that a contributor in a film retains
ownership of its copyright interests, but where there is an implied license to
use the contribution, if the scope of that license is exceeded, a copyright
claim may be launched.

VII. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The denial of a preliminary injunction is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131
(9th Cir. 2011). A district court abuses its discretion ifit bases its decision
"on an erroneous legal standard or clearly erroneous findings of fact." Id.
(quoting Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981,986 (9th Cir. 2008) (en
banc). A district court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo and its
factual findings for clear error. Id. (quoting Lands Council, 537 F.3d at 98687). In doing so, the reviewing court "first look[ s]] to whether the trial court
identified and applied the correct legal rule to the relief requested. Second,
the court looks to whether the trial court's resolution resulted from a factual
finding that was illogical, implausible or without support in inferences that
may be drawn from the facts in the record. United States v. Hinkson, 585
F.3d 1247. 1263 (9 th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff "must establish that he
is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm
in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his
favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Winter v. NRDC, 555
U.S. 7, 20 (2008). A preliminary injunction is proper if there is a likelihood
of irreparable injury to plaintiff; there are serious questions going to the
merits, the balance of hardships tips sharply in favor of the plaintiff; and the
22
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injunction is in the public interest. Alliance for Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at
1131-1132.

VIII. ARGUMENT
The district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a
preliminary injunction and was incorrect in its conclusions of law.

A.

Plaintiff Is Likely to Succeed on the Merits
1.

Plaintiff Clearly Owns the Rights to Her Dramatic
Performance.

Once Ms. Garcia's performance was put in film, it became a
"dramatic work" "fixed in [a] tangible medium of expression" that could be
"perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated" through "the aid of a
machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); see Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 50 Cal. App.
4th 1911, 1919-1920 (1996) ("their individual performances in the film
White Dragon were copyrightable. Since their section 3344 claims seek
only to prevent CBS from reproducing and distributing their performances in
the film, their claims must be preempted by federal copyright law"); see also
Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada, Inc., 617 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir.
2010) (holding that claim that actor's right of publicity claim, arising from
unauthorized use of performance in DVD's, came within subject of
copyright); Laws v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir.
2006) (finding voice recordings were plainly original works of authorship
fixed in a tangible medium). Ms. Garcia's individual performance in the
film "Desert Warrior" is copyrightable. See ide (actors' individual
performances in film are copyrightable).
The district court apparently was under the impression that an actor's
rights to his or her performance automatically revert to the filmmaker once
they collaborate to create a unitary work. Not true. First, if that were the
23
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law, filmmakers would not engage in the universal practice of requiring their
actors to release their copyrights as a condition of appearing in films, which
did not occur in this case. Second, Laws v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 448
F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006), and Jules Jordan Video, 617 F.3d 1146,
confirm that in the Ninth Circuit, a performer retains the rights in her
performance unless she transfers or assigns them: (1) by virtue of her status
as an employee of the filmmaker; (2) by a written assignment of the
copyright; or (3) by executing a written work-for-hire agreement. In fact, it
is clear that the law, not only of the Ninth Circuit, but also as understood by
the United States Patent and Trademark Office and the Copyright Office, is

and a/ways has been that the copyright interest in an actor's performance
resides with that actor until and unless it is assigned. (See RJN at 3.)
The United States publicly affirmed this position in connection with
the signing of the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO")
Audiovisual Dramatic Performance Treaty ("AVP Treaty") signed in
Beijing, China in July of2012. See RJN at 4; ER a176-177. The United
States was instrumental in encouraging other countries to sign the AVP
Treaty in order to bring other countries into compliance with the longstanding acknowledgement in the United States that actors, just like
musicians, own the rights to their performances unless assigned, unless they
are employees, or unless they execute a written instrument indicating their
work is a work-for-hire. The formal statement issued by the United States
Copyright Office, in connection with the A VP Treaty, states:
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Under U.S. law, actors and musicians are considered to be
"authors" of their performances providing them with
copyright rights.
Just as the rights established in the U.S. law already p rovide
the protection for musical performers mandated by tile WPPT,
U.S. law is already generally com,patible with the AVP
provisions ("points of atlacfunent for parties to this treaty
under U.S. law).
See RJN at 4; ER 177.
Because U.S. law firmly establishes that actors own the copyrights in
their performances unless assigned or otherwise relinquished, Plaintiff
Garcia retains the copyright to her performance.

See,~,

TMTV Corp. v

Pegasus Broad. of San Juan, 490 F Supp. 2d 228 (D.C. Puerto Rico 2007)
(actors' portrayals of characters rendered them "authors").
2.

Plaintiff Never Assigned Her Copyright Interests, As
Required by This Court's Decision in Effects Associates.

Appellant is aware of no authority requiring her to bear the burden to
show that she did not transfer her rights. Imposing such a burden on
Appellant would be entirely inconsistent with the Copyright Act's wellestablished requirement that a copyright assignment be made in writing. See
17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (exclusive copyright assignment must be in writing; 17
U.S.C. § 201(b) (writing required for work-for-hire). Appellant executed no
such writing transferring or assigning her rights. Garcia Decl.

~~

7-9; ER

194.
In many cases, an actor or musician relinquishes his or her copyright
interests to a studio or filmmaker in writing and loses the right to assert a
copyright claim in a performance. See, e.g., Brown v. Twentieth Century

In direct contravention to the position of the United States in connection
with advancing the AVP Treaty, the district court held that actors are not
"authors" of their performances.
3
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Fox Film Corp., 799 F. Supp. 166 (D.D.C. 1992) (James Brown transferred
rights to song "Please, Please, Please," and could not object to use of a
musical clip captured on film); Rooney v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 538 F.
Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (actor Mickey Rooney signed contracts broad
enough to transfer rights in his performances); Muller v. Walt Disney
Productions, 871 F. Supp. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (conductor made writing in
which he gave up rights to his performance).
That did not happen here.
Appellant's recollection coincides with that of other "Desert Warrior"
actors, who also did not sign releases. (Declaration ofDan Sutter_ ~ 4 ER

239; Declaration of Gaylord Flynn

~

4, ER 241-242.) Moreover, the Ninth

Circuit has resoundingly rejected the argument that moviemakers enjoy
some special status under the Copyright Act allowing them to avoid the
writing requirement. Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, et aI., 908 F.2d 555
(9th Cir. 1990), is instructive. In that case, the plaintiff created special
effects for use in a film, and then brought a copyright infringement action
against the producer. As in this case, the parties had no written agreement
regarding transfer of the plaintiffs copyright to the producer. The Ninth
Circuit held that, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs rights had not transferred:
"Absent an express transfer of ownership, a contributor who is not an
employee retains ownership of his copyright." Id. at 558 (citing Easter Seal
Society v. Playboy Enters., 815 F. 2d 323, 329 (5 th Cir. 1987)). The court
went on to hold:
[Slection 101 specifically addresses the movie and book
publishing industries, aftording moviemakers a simple,
~traightf~rward w~y of obtaining owner~hip of the copyright
In a creatIve contnbutlOn - namely a wrItten agreement. The
Supreme Court and this circuit, while recognizmg the custom
ana practice in the industry, have refused to permit
movlemakers to sidestep section 2fJ4 's writing requirement.
26
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Accordinglr, we find unpersuasive Cohen's contention that
section 204 s writing requirement, which singles out no
particular group, somehow doesn't apply to rum. As section
204 makes no special allowances for the movie industry,
neither do we.
Effects Assoc. at 558 (emphasis added). See also Oddo v. Ries, 743 F. 2d
630 (9th Cir 1984) (publishing of distorted manuscript exceeded scope of
initial contributor's work; publisher liable for copyright infringement).
Thus, because no writing exists showing either a transfer of rights or a workfor-hire agreement, the copyright in Appellant's performance remains intact.
3.

Defendant Y ousseff and Plaintiff Garcia Never Agreed,
in Writing or Otherwise, to Create a "Joint Work of
Authorship," as Google and YouTube Apparently Claim.

Appellant anticipated Y ouTube to oppose, claiming Appellant could
not sue Defendant Y ousseff for copyright infringement (or, by extension,
Google and Y ouTube for contributory infringement) because Appellant and
Defendant Yousseff created a "joint work of authorship." However,

Appellantnever had a meeting of the minds with Defendant Y ousseff, other
than perhaps pertaining to "Desert Warrior." "Joint work" defenses should
be carefully evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the
"authors" intended to create a "unitary work." Here, Y ousseff s fraudulent
procurement of Ms. Garcia's performance did not create a joint agreement
on anything related to the propaganda Film "The Innocence of Muslims."
Initially, Appellant notes that the burden is on Defendants, not on her,
to show that both she and Y ousseff intended that the doctored propaganda
Film "The Innocence of Muslims," which she was tricked into believing was
a desert historical adventure called "Desert Warrior," would be a joint work
of authorship.
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Although the Second and Seventh Circuits do not base their
decisions [as to joint authorship] on the word 'authors' in the
statute, the practical results they reach are consistent with ours.
These cirCUIts have held that a Rerson claiming to be an author
of a joint work must prove that both parties intended each
other to be joint authors.
Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.2d 1227, 1233-1234 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis
added). Aalmuhammad is significant in two ways, both of which the district
court ignored: First, as noted above, it establishes that the burden is on the

putative joint author, not the person claiming a sole copyright, to prove the
intent to create a jointly authored work. Second, it suggests that in this case,
where there is no written joint authorship agreement, a contributory infringer
such as Google or Y ouTube cannot establish a joint authorship defense,
because it cannot prove Ms. Garcia's or Yousseffs subjective intentions.
Perhaps this second point is academic, because in this case the
uncontroverted evidence is that Appellant never intended to be a 'joint
author" of "The Innocence of Muslims," given that Defendant Yousseff
tricked her by assuring her that she was appearing in an innocuous action
film called "Desert Warrior."
Even if the burden of proof were not an insurmountable obstacle for
Defendants, the law of joint authorship would be. While "joint" authors
may not sue each other in copyright, see 17 U.S.C. § 101, a "joint work"
exists "only when both authors intended at the time the work was created,

'that their contributions be merged into separate or interdependent parts of
a unitary whole. '" Id.; Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2 nd Cir. 1991)
(emphasis added). "Copyright law best serves the interests of creativity
when it carefully draws the bounds of 'joint authorship' so as to protect the
legitimate claims of both sole authors and co-authors." Id. "Where the
author never intended for his material to be part of a joint work, he retains
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the right to that material." Siegel v. Time Warner, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 2d
1111, 1148 (C.D. Cal. 2007). If the parties' intentions at the beginning of
the creative process are inconsistent, there is "a lack of intent to form a

joint work." See, e.g., Reinsdorfv. Skechers, U.S.A., 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 28293, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9,2011) (use of copyrighted
photographs was limited to terms of license, not entitling Skechers to use
them as it "saw fit,,).4
4.

YouTube Has Stepped Far Outside the DMCA's Safe
Harbor Provision, Subjecting it To Liability for
Copyright Infringement.

_"The DMCA was enacted in 1998 to implement the World
Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty," Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.2d 429,440 (2d Cir. 2001), and to update
domestic copyright law. See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th
Cir.2004). Title II of the DMCA, titled separately the Online Copyright
Infringement Liability Limitation Act ("OCILLA") was designed to
"c1arifTy] the liability faced by service providers who transmit potentially
infringing material over their networks." S. Rep. 105-190 at 2 (1998).
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Congress elected "to create a series of 'safe harbors []' for certain common
activities of service providers." Id. at 19. To that end, OCILLA established
a serious of four "safe harbors" that allow qualifying service providers to
limit their liability for claims of copyright infringement. See Viacom, et al.
v. YouTube, et aI, (2nd Cir. AprilS, 2012), Case No. 10-3270 CV (RJN at
4.) YouTube is such a provider. See generally id.; see also RJN 6 (2nd
Circuit opinion on DMCA issues relative to YouTube).
Under 512(c)(1)(A), safe harbor protection is available only if the
service provider:
(i)

Does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity
using the material on the system or network is infringing;

(ii)

In the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts
or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or

(iii)

upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts
expeditiously to remove or disable access to the material.

In short, OCILLA creates a safe harbor for online service providers
("OSPs"), only if they adhere to the mandatory safe harbor guidelines and
"expeditiously" block access to alleged infringing material, or remove that
material from their systems when they receive a notification of an
infringement claim from a copyright holder or the copyright holder's agent.
OCILLA also includes a counter-notification provision that offers OSPs a
safe harbor from liability when users claim that the material in question is
not, in fact, infringing.
5.

Even if Defendant YousseffHad a Joint Copyright
Interest with Ms. Garcia, None of the Third Parties Who
Have Posted the Film Have A Right to Do So, and Are
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Infringing on Plaintiff s Copyright With YouTube' s Full
Knowledge and Consent.
While YouTube and Google may raise the issue of "joint work" and
joint copyright as between Appellant and Yousseff (albeit Appellant
absolutely contests that argument as stated above), there is no such issue
with respect to the hundreds of third parties who have copied the Film and
re-posted it on Y ouTube, accounting for tens of millions of views for
YouTube. It is undisputed that these third parties have no right to copy and
re-post the Film, and are clearly committing copyright infringement.
Defendants Y ouTube and Google cannot argue otherwise, and have been on
notice of these massive acts of infringement for quite some time. The eight
DMCA takedown notices delivered by Ms. Garcia's DMCA take down agent
specifically named and identified these third party Y ouTube URLs and
requested that YouTube remove or disable them. Defendants YouTube and
Google have refused.

IX.

APPELLANT CONTINUES TO SUFFER IRREPARABLE
HARM IN THE ABSENCE OF AN INJUNCTION
At this point in the proceedings, in light of the district court's disposal

of Ms. Garcia's request for an emergency temporary restraining order
("TRO"), it is the law applicable to temporary injunctions that applies in this
case. That said, even under the far stricter standards that apply to a TRO,
Ms. Garcia was entitled to relief. In order to obtain a TRO, a plaintiff must
be in danger of an irreparable injury that is both likely and immediate.
Winter v. Nat. Res. Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 129 S.Ct. 365, 37475, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008); Caribbean Marine Services Co .. , Inc. v.
Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) ("a plaintiff must demonstrate
immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive
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relief'). Risk of death constitutes "irreparable harm." See, e.g., Harris v.
Board of Supervisors, 366 F.3d 754, 766 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming
preliminary injunction barring Los Angeles County from closing hospital
and reducing public hospital beds due to risk of irreparable harm to patients
including death); Yue v. Conseco, CV 11-9506 AHM, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 46565, 40-41 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2012) (preliminary injunction
warranted against increased cost of life insurance because loss of "security"
and "peace of mind" constitutes irreparable injury).
Appellant more than met her burden. As set forth above and in the
accompanying declarations, she has suffered and will continue to suffer
immediate and irreparable harm if the Film is not taken down:
• Ms. Garcia received credible threats of death and harm against
both herself and her family (one individual threatened to rape
her daughter repeatedly);
• Ms. Garcia has had to move her personal residence due to
threats and harassment;
• Appellant has been advised repeatedly and in the strongest
terms to take the most stringent security measures possible to
protect herself; and
• Every moment the Film remains on Y ouTube, her copyright
continues to be violated.

x.

THE BALANCE OF EQUITIES IS IN PLAINTIFF'S FAVOR
Under the circumstances of this case - not just the serious intellectual

property issues raised by Ms. Garcia's claim, but more importantly, the
credible threats of death against her, the hardship to Ms. Garcia if the Film is
not removed is grave indeed. It is true that the law requires this Court to
"balance" the relative hardships to the parties when evaluating a request for
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a temporary restraining order. To this day, Defendants Google and
YouTube have provided Ms. Garcia with no rationale for their cruel decision
to continue to endanger her life by continuing to publish the video: the only
excuses they make for themselves are: (1) Yousseffs racist belief that "the
Muslims" have killed unspecified "innocent" people; and (2) Google
Chairman Eric Schmidt's disingenuous claim that the problems experienced
by innocent people (such as Ms. Garcia) due to the Film can simply be cured
with "more speech."s In reality, the circumstantial evidence is far more
damning, particularly to Google and YouTube. As set forth on the YouTube
site, the Film has received more than 30 million page "views" in English
alone-and Ms. Garcia expects that number to soar once discovery
commences and she obtains page view numbers for Arabic-language
versions. Because YouTube derives income from advertising revenues and
"views", it has 30 million reasons to leave the Film where it is, and let Ms.
Garcia fend for herself.
The balance of hardships cannot tip to any side other than to
Appellant. "The balance of equities strongly favors [the Plaintiff] because
Defendants' only interest is fiscal, whereas the [Plaintiff] faces life or death
consequences." See Oster v. Lightboume, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138191
(N.D. Cal. 2011)

XI.

AN INJUNCTION IS DECIDLY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Finally, Appellant must show that an injunction is in the public

interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 365,374,376
S

Of course, Mr. Schmidt's encouragement of "more speech" directly
contradicts that of his counsel, Tim Alger, who has repeatedly blamed
Plaintiffs exercise of her right to free speech - that is, her public stance in
distancing herself from the Film - for the peril she is currently experiencing.
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(2008); National Meat Ass'n v. Brown, 599 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2010);
see also Beardslee v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 2005). It is.
Defendants' actions have not just put the life of Cindy Lee Garcia in danger.
They have endangered the lives of every actor and member of the crew
subject to the latwa. Media reports have already reported numerous deaths
caused by violence related to the Film. The web giant known as Google, a
name derived from the number 10 with 100 zeroes, pursues Mammon at the
expense of innocents.
Appellant anticipates that Defendants to argue again that the First
Amendment trumps the worldwide carnage sparked by the Film. It does not.
First, Ms. Garcia is a private individual who is not acting in concert with the
state; she therefore is not capable of violating the First Amendment. See,
e.g., Law v. Miller, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102527 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
(rejecting claim that non-governmental parties violated First Amendment
where defendants were not state employees and there was no nexus between
the defendants and the state such that the defendants' actions might fairly be
treated as those of the state). Second, the First Amendment does not protect
copyright infringement. Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443
(C.D. Cal. 2007) ("To the extent that the users are engaged in copyright
infringement, the First Amendment affords them no protection
whatsoever.") (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559). Third, even if the
Film did not violate Ms. Garcia's copyright, by now it is clear that
Defendants' actions can be compared to falsely shouting "Fire!" in a theater,
creating a "clear and present danger" outside the protections of the First
Amendment. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63
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L.Ed.470. Accordingly, this public interest would be best protected by a
take down order. 6
Further, Defendant Yousseffviolated the terms of his federal criminal
probation by posting the Film - he was prohibited from using a computer or
accessing the Internet. (See RJN 5 & Ex. B.) As the worldwide events
described in this brief unfolded, Defendant Y ousseff was arrested on a
probation violation and now sits in the Metropolitan Detention Center in Los
Angeles. Magistrate Judge Segal found that he may have violated the terms
of his probation, used aliases, and is both a flight risk and danger to the
community. (See RJN 5 & Ex. B.) The public has an interest in ensuring
that criminal defendants do not violate probation terms -- and that Google
and Y ouTube not continue to aid and abet him in doing so7 - which is
exactly what has here been done.

XII. RELIEF REQUESTED
Based on the above, Appellant requests that the district court's order
denying the motion for preliminary injunction be reversed. The specific
relief requested by Appellant in the lower Court was an order enjoining
Google and Y ouTube:
6
YouTube's own guidelines prohibit the P9sting of "hate speech"-a
clearer case of hate speech is hard to imagine. Y ouTube can haraly claim an
interest, other than a monetary one, in continuing its unlimited exliibit of the
Film.

7
"Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commends, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal." 18 U.S.C. § 2. In this case, Defendants Google and YouTube
are now knowingly aiding and abetting Defendant Y ousseff s continued
violation of his federal probation by keeping the video posted. Counsel for
Plaintiff have provided counsel for Y ouTube and Google the Judgment and
Commitment for Y ousseff showing that he was prohibited from using the
Internet, computers, or ISPs without the permission of the United States
Probation Officer.
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From publishing, reproducing, disclosing, or otherwise

allowing the Copyrighted Performance (the original, un-dubbed script of
which is identified in Exhibit A to Ms. Garcia's Complaint) to be uploaded
or shown on YouTube.com and any other Websites operated by Defendants,
or any of them, and from copying or allowing the content to be copied into
any computer database, information service, storage facility, archives or
other computerized network or facility:
2.

From disclosing or displaying, or causing to be disclosed or

displayed, any portion of Ms. Garcia's Copyrighted Performance;
3.

From destroying or concealing, or in any way disposing of any

reproduction, facsimile, excerpt, or derivative of any work related to the
Copyrighted Performance that is in Defendants' possession, custody or
control.
Appellant also sought an impoundment order, such that Defendants
tum over for impoundment, to remain in the custody of Ms. Garcia's counsel
during the pendency of this action, all unauthorized copies of in their
custody, possession or control of the copyrighted works of Ms. Garcia,
including but not limited to:
4.

All copies of the Copyrighted Performance, whether contained

in the Film, whether as titled "Desert Warrior" or "The Innocence of
Muslims," in the possession, custody, or control of Defendants.
5.

Any and all media in which the Copyrighted Performance is

stored within the possession, custody, or control of Google and YouTube,
including but not limited to computers, computer disks, cassette tapes, hard
drives, CD-ROMs, DVDs, USB sticks, and other media.
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XII. CONCLUSION
In summary, the district court's conclusion is insupportable: under
controlling legal authority, Ms. Garcia does have a property interest in her
Copyrighted Perfonnance. If this Court adopted the trial court's view of
copyright law, it would tum the entire media and music industry on their
heads. Further, the trial court relied on no evidence whatsoever to support
its findings, whether explicit or implicit, that Garcia was an employee and/or
produced a "work for hire." Indeed, Defendants' late proffer of forged
documents purporting to create such a relationship reveals that even
Defendants are aware that Ms. Garcia never ceded her copyright interest.
Additionally, the district court erred in faulting Appellant for the timing of
her motion: Plaintiff has shown that she acted immediately once she
understood the danger (both to her property and her life) that Defendants had
placed her in.
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court
REVERSE the trial court's denial of her request for a preliminary injunction.

Respectfully sub . eel,

Dated: January 18,2013

JfLi·naMmen~

Attorney for Petitioner
Cindy Lee Garcia
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